The 1975 Referendum on Europe - Volume 1 by Mark Baimbridge

Author:Mark Baimbridge
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Europe, EU, European Union, referendum, constitution, economics, politics, diplomacy, democracy, eurosceptic, euroskeptic, government, self-government
ISBN: 9781845406301
Publisher: Andrews UK Limited 2016
Published: 2016-11-07T00:00:00+00:00

The Inside View from No.10

Bernard Donoughue

The first government thistle which we had to grasp was the renegotiation of the terms of Britain’s membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). This was to dominate the Prime Minister’s and our time over the next nine months, concluding with the Referendum which had been promised in both recent election campaigns, and I and the Policy Unit were heavily involved throughout in detailed briefing to the Prime Minister.

The political background was that in 1972 the Labour Party had been seriously split, with Roy Jenkins resigning the deputy leadership, over Edward Heath’s successful application to join the EEC. A majority of the Labour Party in Parliament and in the country, and of the Prime Minister’s senior colleagues, were against membership.

So in 1974 Wilson saw the issue not - as did Jenkins for the ‘pros’ and Benn for the ‘antis’ - as one of principle, but as a question of political party management. His twin objectives were to prevent Labour from inescapably committing itself to withdrawal from the EEC, and from breaking up the Party over the issue. He successfully achieved these by offering at the two 1974 elections the immediate prospects of renegotiating better terms for Britain’s membership, followed by a referendum of the whole British people.

Fulfilling this promise was not to prove easy, since Jenkins and many on the right were uncompromisingly committed to EEC membership while Benn, Shore, Foot and the left were opposed with equal dogmatism.

Wilson was also assisted by the use of two rare political devices. First he suspended normal collective responsibility and in the Referendum campaign allowed dissenting colleagues to oppose whatever was to be the Government’s formal decision on Europe without resigning. This so-called ‘Agreement to Differ’ gave Wilson useful political elastic to avoid splitting the Cabinet asunder. The referendum mechanism itself was also novel and convenient to Wilson. It was originally advocated by Tory and then by Labour anti-Common Marketeers seeking a way to block entry to the EEC and was opposed by Jenkins because of that extremist support. In the event it sank Benn, who proposed it to Wilson, and confirmed the victory of Jenkins, who had passionately opposed it. Wilson at first rejected the whole concept of a referendum; but then on second thoughts he shrewdly saw its utility to him. He realised that a vote of the whole British people would dilute and swamp the opposition from Labour activists, who were strong in the Party, but small in the country as a whole.

Wilson typically approached the EEC renegotiations with the recent election manifesto permanently in his pocket to serve as his guideline. He knew that, providing he stuck to the manifesto and then secured a majority in Cabinet, he could not be attacked in the Party.

The renegotiations were thrashed out in broad principles at a succession of summit meetings of Heads of Government, while the critical details were settled at lower diplomatic levels under the shrewd leadership of Jim Callaghan, and these two experienced politicians worked together in close tandem.

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